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 How Efficient are the Current U.S. Beer Taxes? 
 




Abstract. This paper examines the status of current beer taxes in the U.S. by questioning 
how far away the present beer taxes are from the optimal taxes. Following the estimation of 
tax elasticity, I estimate the lifetime discounted costs that a heavy drinker levies on others 
through: 1) Years of life lost; 2) Social insurance system; 3) Drunk driving accidents; and 
4) Forgone income taxes. The optimal level of beer tax ranges from 17.15 percent to 47.5 
percent of the price per drink. Even the conservative estimates suggest that current beer 
taxes comprise only 16 percent of the external costs.  
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1. Introduction 
ederal alcohol taxes have not been raised since 1991 and since then only 
a handful of states have opted for state-level increases in alcohol taxes. The 
real prices and taxes for beer have plummeted over recent decades. Although 
past studies suggest that moderate and light drinking can be beneficial to health, 
alcohol-related tragedies such as drunk driving, crime, and liver cirrhosis are well 
documented. From a Pigovian viewpoint, alcohol taxes can be used as a medium to 
cover not just the internal, but also the external costs of alcohol consumption. The 
lack of initiative shown by policymakers to raise alcohol taxes leads one to 
question the current status and role of alcohol taxes in the United States.  
There are two main reasons that may explain a policymaker’s reluctant attitude 
towards raising alcohol taxes. The first one is the lobbying power established by 
the beer companies. The second one can possibly be attributed to political 
convenience. Greenfield et al. (2007) suggest that drinking sentiments have 
increased in past decades. Higher alcohol taxes would not only increase prices for 
heavy drinkers but also for light and moderate drinkers, who constitute a majority 
of the population. Hence, increasing alcohol taxes may lead to additional political 
costs than, for example, a tax increase in cigarettes.  
From an economic perspective, the failure to adequately tax alcohol may 
promote behaviors that lead to inefficient decisions.  Although the needs for 
alcohol taxes are clear, how well the current level of alcohol taxes perform in 
addressing the external costs associated with heavy drinking is theoretically 
ambiguous. Given that heavy drinking leads to higher medical costs, these costs 
may be borne by the social insurance systems, such as Medicaid and Medicare. 
However, if heavy drinking leads to premature death, heavy drinkers may cross-
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subsidize their Medicare and social security shares to non-heavy drinkers.  A priori, 
it is not clear as to whether a heavy drinker imposes any additional net external 
costs to a society. 
This study estimates the optimal level of beer taxation in the United States. I 
first estimate price elasticity for both moderate and heavy drinkers by utilizing the 
recent tax changes and using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance 
System (BRFSS) for the years 1996 to 2007. I use data from the National Health 
Interview Survey (NHIS) linked with National Vital System Statistics (NVSS) and 
the Medical Panel Survey (MEPS to estimate the lifetime costs imposed by a heavy 
drinker on others in terms of years of life lost, Medicaid and Medicare, and drunk 
driving accidents, respectively. To account for differences in how a person values 
the future than the present, costs are discounted by using a discount rate of 3 
percent at 18 years of age. I use the findings established by Sloan & Ostermann 
(2004) to determine the cost of heavy drinking on social security outlays. I utilize 
the framework of optimal alcohol taxation established by Pogue & Sgontz (1989) 
to estimate the optimal level of alcohol taxes.  
I find that a heavy drinker does not pay his/her way out at the current level of 
beer taxes. The level of beer taxes in 2015 at $0.073per drink covers (converted to 
2009 dollars) approximately covers 16 percent of the external costs associated with 
drinking. Findings from the benchmark model, which declares with certainty that a 
heavy drinker will suffer from alcohol-related diseases (ALD), suggest that an 
optimallevel of beer taxes is $0.63 per drink. After making an adjustment to the 
probability of a heavy drinker suffering from ALD, the findings suggest $0.23 per 
drink as an optimal level of beer taxes. The calculation to obtain such an estimate 
uses conservative values and represents an estimate towards a lower range. Failing 
to consider costs due to alcohol-related liver cirrhosis puts the optimal level of beer 
taxes at $0.20.The overall findings of this study recommend an increase in alcohol 
taxes for taxes to be effectively used as a mechanism to internalize the external 
costs associated with alcohol consumption. 
Two previous studies have evaluated the optimal level of alcohol taxes. Pogue 
& Sgontz (1989) present a wide estimate of the alcohol tax rate ranging from 19 to 
306 percent and claim 51 percent as their best-guess estimate. Kenkel (1996) 
extends the framework of Pogue & Sgontz (1989) to narrow the range of the 
alcohol tax rate and finds that the optimal tax rate is over 100 percent of the net-of-
tax price. However, the author emphasizes alcohol taxation as the second best 
option, concluding that the level of alcohol taxes would be much lower if the 
punishment for drunk driving were more severe. A seminal study by Pogue & 
Sgontz (1989) assumes that the price elasticity of both moderate and heavy 
drinkers is the same. Consequently, the study provides an outdated version of costs 
related to alcohol consumption, does not break down the medical costs borne by 
the social insurance system, and exclude estimates of years of life lost due to heavy 
drinking when calculating the optimal taxes.  
 
2. Framework and Assumptions 
The framework for optimal taxation follows from Pogue & Sgontz’s (1989) 
seminal paper. To begin, I assume that there are two types of consumers - moderate 
drinkers and heavy drinkers who are more liable to create alcohol-related risks. 
Figure 1 shows the demand schedule for light and heavy drinkers. Here, Dh 
represents the demand curve for heavy drinkers and Dl pertains to moderate 
drinkers. For simplicity, I assume that there is only one alcoholic beverage that is 
produced in a competitive market at a constant marginal cost of production. The 
optimal level of taxation would vary depending on the type of alcoholic beverage 
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(beer, wine, spirits). Unfortunately, it is impossible to identify the exact type of 
beverage consumed given the data. According to a report from the National 
Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, beer comprises more than half of the 
ethanol consumption in the United States (approximately 54 percent of per-capita 
ethanol consumption in 2006) and stands as a most prevalent form of alcoholic 
beverage consumed in the country.
1
 Given this fact, this study focuses on beer 
taxes. 
An assumption in a competitive market is that higher alcohol taxes are fully 
passed through as alcohol prices. However, market for beer can be best categorized 
as an oligopoly. Kenkel (2005) provides evidence that alcohol taxes are more than 
fully passed through as prices in Alaska. Similarly, Young & Kwapisz (2002) 
suggest that excise taxes on beer are more than fully passed-through. In a recent 
study, using the data from 2000 to 2014, Shrestha & Markowitz (2015) provide 
evidence that consumer fully bear the burden of increases in beer taxes.  
Specifically, I estimate tax elasticity more so than price elasticity for both moderate 
and heavy drinkers. A tax elasticity of -0.5 would precisely suggest that an increase 
in alcohol taxes by 1 percent leads to a reduction in alcohol consumption by 0.5 
percent. Two main advantages of using taxes in favor of prices are: 1) Taxation is a 
key policy instrument and tax elasticity directly corresponds to optimal taxation; 
and 2) Taxes reduce an issue of measurement error present in prices, which can 
downward bias the estimate of price elasticity.
2
 
Figure 1 also shows the price and marginal social cost. The difference between 
price P and the marginal social cost represents the marginal external cost of alcohol 
consumption, which is negligible for moderate drinkers but increases with an 
increase in alcohol consumption. When the price of alcohol is P, heavy drinkers 
consume xaamounts of alcohol; whereas, light drinkers consume xb. For heavy 
drinkers, the marginal social cost at the point of consumption (xa) is greater than 
the marginal benefit, which leads to market inefficiency if external costs are not 
considered. Alcohol taxes T can allow a heavy drinker to internalize the amount of 
external costs imposed by a heavy drinker; thus, leading towards an efficient level 
of alcohol consumption at xA for heavy drinkers. However, a light drinker reduces 
alcohol consumption to xB. The welfare gain due to higher alcohol taxes is 
represented by the reduction in social cost (area h) among heavy drinkers and the 
loss in consumer surplus experienced by light drinkers (area l) as the deadweight 
loss. The welfare gain can be written as:  
 
𝑊 =  𝑥𝑎 − 𝑥𝐴 ∗ 𝐸 ∗ 𝑛 −  𝑥𝑎 − 𝑥𝐴 ∗
𝑇
2
∗ 𝑛 −  𝑥𝑏 − 𝑥𝐵 ∗
𝑇
2
∗  1 − 𝑛 ,   (1) 
 
where the first two combined terms represent the welfare gain achieved when 
heavy drinkers reduce their alcohol consumption. The third term represents the loss 
in consumer surplus for moderate drinkers due to the imposition of alcohol taxes. 
The proportion of heavy drinkers in a population is represented by 𝑛. 
The assumption that taxes are fully passed through as prices yield 
 
 𝑥𝑎 − 𝑥𝐴 =  𝜂ℎ ∗
𝑇
𝑃
∗ 𝑥𝐴 ,         (2) 
 
where𝜂ℎ  represents the price elasticity of demand for heavy drinkers. A similar 
equation can be obtained for light drinkers. Substituting equation (2) into equation 
(1) gives the following equation: 
 
𝑊 =  𝜂𝐻 ∗
𝑇
𝑃












∗  1 − 𝑛   (3) 
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To find the optimal taxation, the first-order condition to maximize social 















          (4) 
 
In equation (4), 𝐸 represents the external costs associated with drinking, 𝑇 is the 
optimal amount of tax in dollars per drink, 
𝜂𝑙
𝜂ℎ
 is the relative price elasticity of the 
risky and non-risky drinkers, and 
𝑋′𝐵
𝑋′𝐴
 is relative drinks consumed by light and 
heavy drinkers, where 𝑋′𝐴 = 𝑥𝑎 ∗ 𝑛  and𝑋
′
𝐵 = 𝑥𝑏 ∗ 𝑛.  Equation (4) gives the 
optimal tax rate on a given price 𝑃. The given equation suggests that the amount of 
tax is directly proportional to the external costs and inversely related to the relative 
prices elasticity of moderate versus heavy drinkers. In other words, if heavy 
drinkers are more responsive to higher alcohol prices compared to moderate 
drinkers, then the optimal level of alcohol taxes is increased.  
 
3. Estimating the Price Elasticity of Demand for Moderate 
and Heavy Drinkers 
3.1. Data 
3.1.1. Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) 
Data on alcohol consumption and other individual characteristics come from the 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) for the years 1996 to 2007. 
BRFSS comprises nationally representative samples of individuals with a 
comparatively large sample size. Questions asked in the survey reflect the drinking 
behavior of an individual, such as the number of days an individual drinks in a 
month, the average number of drinks a respondent consumes while he/she drinks, 
and the number of days in a month an individual participates in heavy drinking. To 
capture the overall drinking behavior, the number of drinks a person consumes per 
month is used as the dependent variable. It is a calculated variable constructed by 
multiplying the number of days an individual drinks per month and the average 
drinks he/she consumes while drinking.  
Apart from the BRFSS sample being a nationally representative survey with a 
large sample size; it comprises a relatively rich set of socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics, which are shown in the summary statistics table 
(Tables 1). The personal characteristics that this study controls for are income, age, 
gender, race, employment status, education, and marital status. Moreover, the 
respondents report their state of residence, which allows for merging the state-level 
variables with each observation.  This study excludes observations from Puerto 
Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, thus restricting the sample to the fifty states 
and the District of Columbia. Individuals with unknown age are dropped. Finally, 
observations with a missing value for the number of drinks consumed per month 
are also discarded. 
3.1.2. Alcohol Taxes  
Data for beer taxes comes from the Alcohol Policy Information System (APIS) 
and the respective taxes are corroborated using the tax reported by the Tax 
Foundation and Brewers Almanac. Taxation serves as a direct policy instrument; 
hence, the results from using taxes are relevant to policymakers. However, to be 
able to identify the effect of higher alcohol taxes on alcohol consumption in the 
model that controls for the state unobserved time invariant heterogeneity, it is 
critical to have an adequate amount of within-state variation in alcohol taxes. From 
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1996 to 2007, there were ten incidences of changes in beer tax. Figure 2A shows 
the trend in state-level real beer taxes per gallon. Figure 2B shows the trend in 
nominal state-level beer taxes per gallon for the group of states that experienced 
tax changes and those states without tax changes. For the group of states that 
experienced tax changes, the average state-level nominal taxes per gallon increased 
by more than 10 cents between 1996 and 2007, suggesting the presence of within 
state variation in beer taxes. 
3.2. Identification Strategy 
I use within-state variation in beer taxes occurring over time to identify the 
effect of higher alcohol taxes on alcohol consumption. I use a two-part model 
similar to Manning et al. (1995) to model alcohol consumption. The two-part 
model is used for three reasons: 1) Significant proportion of individuals in the 
sample reported having not consumed any alcoholic beverage in the past month 
(approximately 45 % of 18-to-24 year-olds), 2) Drinkers have a right skewed 
distribution for monthly number of drinks consumed, which is approximately log 
normal (for 18-to-24 year-olds); and 3) The two-part model presents some 
behavioral appeal as responsiveness to price can be estimated in an extensive and 
intensive margins. The first part models an individual’s participation decision 
(decision to drink) and the second part models one’s intensity of alcohol 
consumption, given that the person consumed alcohol. The first part model refers 
to the extensive margin and can be written as follows: 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑠 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑎 log 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑠 + µ𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑠 +  𝛿𝑍𝑡𝑠 +  𝜂𝑡 + 𝜃𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑠 ,              (5a) 
 
Here, 𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑠  is a binary variable taking a value of “1” if an individual 𝑖, surveyed 
in year 𝑡, and from state 𝑠 participates in drinking (or heavy drinking). 𝑇𝑎𝑥 is the 
real beer tax (per gallon) converted to 2006 dollars, 𝑋  is individual-specific 
characteristics, and 𝑍 pertains to the state-specific characteristics. The specification 
controls for the year fixed effects represented by 𝜂, which captures the common 
characteristics of all the states that vary over time, and 𝜃𝑠 are the state fixed effects. 
Following Manning et al. (1995), I estimate the first part model using a logistic 
functional form. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are presented.  
Given that an individual participates in drinking, I estimate the second part 
model as follows: 
 
log⁡(𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑠 ) =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑏 log 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑠 + µ𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑠 +  𝛿𝑍𝑡𝑠 + 𝜂𝑡 +  𝜃𝑠 +  𝜆𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑠 ,         (5b) 
 
where𝐴 is a variable capturing an intensity of drinking behavior (number of 
drinks per month)of an individual 𝑖, surveyed in year 𝑡, and from state 𝑠, and other 
variables specified as similar to those in equation (5a). 
Since alcohol-related externalities are prevalent among heavy or risky drinkers, 
I evaluate the differential effects of increases in beer taxes on alcohol consumption. 
Similar to Manning et al. (1995), I use a quantile regression method first 
introduced by Koenker & Basset (1978). While the estimate of 𝛽 in equation (5𝑏) 
represents the price elasticity of demand for alcohol at the conditional mean, use of 
a quantile regression method allows the responsiveness due to increases in beer 
taxes to vary across the conditional distribution of alcohol consumption. The τth 
conditional quantile function is specified as:  
 
log⁡(𝐴𝑖𝑡𝑠 ) =  𝛼τ + 𝛽τ log 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑠 + µτ𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑠 + 𝛿τ𝑍𝑡𝑠 + 𝜂𝑡τ +  𝜃𝑠τ + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑠              (5c) 
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where, the coefficient of interest is 𝛽τ, which is a price elasticity estimate at the 
τth conditionalquantile. For the coefficients pertaining to the quantile regression, 
bootstrap standard errors are estimated from 99 replications.  
Following Manning et al. (1995), the price elasticity of demand from the two-
part model can be written as: 
 
𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  1 − 𝑃 𝛽𝑎 + 𝛽𝑏                   (5d) 
 
where,  𝑃 is the proportion of current drinkers, and 𝛽𝑎  and 𝛽𝑏are the coefficients on 
log 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑡𝑠 for the first part and second part, respectively. Note that  1 − 𝑃 𝛽𝑎  
corresponds to price elasticity at the extensive margin. 
3.3. Results (Tax Elasticity of Demand for Beer) 
Table 2 presents the elasticity estimates obtained from the first and second-part 
model, which is estimated by both the OLS and quantile regression method. The 
results from the first-part model shows the marginal effects obtained from the 
logistic regression. The coefficient on log of beer tax suggests that a percentage 
increase in beer taxes is associated with a reduction in the drinking participation by 
4.5 percentage points and is significant at a 5 percent level. This translates to an 
elasticity estimate at the extensive margin of -0.083. The second-part model 
estimates the conditional elasticity of demand among drinkers. The OLS estimate 
suggests that a one percent increase in beer tax is associated with a reduction in 
alcohol consumption by 0.038 percent; however, the coefficient is imprecisely 
estimated. The estimates from the quantile regression method paints a more 





conditional quantiles are close to zero and statistically insignificant at the 
conventional levels. However, the conditional elasticity estimate at the 75
th
 
conditional quantile is -0.125 and is significant at a 5 percent level. The quantile 
regression estimates suggest that relatively heavy drinkers are more responsive to 
increases in beer taxes. Such findings are consistent with results from Shrestha’s 
(2015) study, which shows that heavy drinkers are responsive to increases in 
alcohol prices.  
The unconditional elasticity estimates are shown in brackets in Table 2, which 
are calculated by following equation (5𝑑). The unconditional elasticity estimates 
suggests that heavy drinkers are relatively more responsive to increases in alcohol 
prices compared to light drinkers. These results help understand the welfare 
implication of increases in beer taxes. As previously mentioned, if increases in beer 
taxes reduce alcohol consumption among light drinkers, who are less prone to 
invoke alcohol-related externalities, higher beer taxes will lead to a deadweight 
loss and possibly lead to no welfare gain; thus reduce overall welfare. However, 
the findings in Table 2 indicates that light or moderate drinkers are non-responsive 
to increases in beer taxes. In contrast, heavy drinkers reduce their alcohol 
consumption as a result of higher beer taxes. Since, alcohol related externalities are 
associated with heavy drinkers rather than light drinkers, increases in beer taxes 
can be welfare enhancing as it lowers alcohol consumption among heavy drinkers. 
The result that heavy drinkers are more responsive to increases in beer prices lends 
support in using beer taxes as a medium to reduce alcohol-related externalities.  
4. The External Cost of Heavy Drinking  
Heavy drinkers impose costs not only on themselves but also for other 
individuals not participating in heavy drinking. The costs borne by heavy drinkers 
themselves are termed as internal costs; whereas, external costs are imposed on 
others. One obvious example of an external cost is damages caused by drunk 
driving. The other cases of external costs can be subtle; for example, higher 
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medical costs in the form of health expenses. Often insurance premiums and taxes 
paid by heavy drinkers and light/moderate drinkers are similar after controlling for 
other characteristics. Hence, light or moderate drinkers may be subsidizing costs 
associated with heavy drinking. In contrast, if heavy drinking lowers life 
expectancy, then a heavy drinker might cross-subsidize moderate drinkers in forms 
of Medicare and pension outlays, given that a heavy drinker contributes the same 
amount to Medicare and Social Security taxes as a moderate drinker does.  
The types of external and internal costs associated with heavy drinking are 
shown in Table 3, which is divided into internal and external costs. The costs 
imposed on family members are explicitly considered as external costs in the sense 
that once a heavy drinker dies, he experiences no cost; however, the burden is 
transferred to family members. While estimating the cost of smoking, Sloan et al. 
(2004) treats the costs of smoking imposed on household members as “quasi-
external”, with social costs being the sum of three different costs- internal, 
external; and quasi-external. The following sections are dedicated to estimating 
costs related to heavy drinking in the following aspects: 1) Reduced life 
expectancy; 2) Medical expenses; 3) Alcohol-related driving accidents; and 4) 
Social Security benefits. 
4.1. Effect of Heavy Drinking on Mortality (Excluding Drunk-Driving) 
Figure 3 shows age-specific deaths due to alcoholic liver disease (ALD), mainly 
comprising of fatty liver disease, alcoholic hepatitis, and liver cirrhosis. The data is 
taken from the National Vital Statistics multiple cause-of-deaths. The count shows 
an increasing trend until age 55, after which the death tolls from ALD start 
declining due to the majority of heavy drinkers dying before 60 years of age. The 
bell- shaped curve in Figure 3 indicates that the mean age of death due to ALD is 
around 55 years. A total of 30,627 deaths in 2009 can be attributed to ALD. Figure 
4 provides the probability of death due to ALD. The figure suggests that at the age 
of 50, approximately 3 deaths can be attributed to ALD for every 100 deaths. 
4.1.1. Method and Data 
It is not appealing to compare a heavy drinker with non-heavy drinker in terms 
of years of life lost as a heavy drinker may differ from a non-heavy drinker in 
several ways. Heavy drinkers may have a poor choice of lifestyle, indulge in 
smoking, and not get adequate physical exercise. For example, as heavy drinkers 
are more likely to smoke, not controlling for smoking status might attribute a 
portion of smoking- related deaths as drinking-related deaths. Instead, the 
comparison in terms of years of life lost should be made between a heavy drinker 
and a “non-drinking heavy drinker.” The concept of non-drinking heavy drinkers 
can be defined as a hypothetical group of people who are similar to heavy drinkers 
in terms of all other characteristics expect heavy drinking.
3
 
A method used in this study applies a period life table technique provided by 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to estimate the mortality 
experience of an actual birth cohort. A hypothetical cohort of 2009 is selected. The 
assumption imposed is that a person experiences an age-specific death rate that is 
prevalent for the actual population in 2009. Ideally, a researcher would want to use 
a cohort life table where a specific cohort is followed over time to estimate the age 
specific death rate. However, such a procedure would require data collection over 
many years and is usually unfeasible. The concept of a hypothetical cohort 
provides a picture of age-specific mortality at a given period of time (National 
Vital Statistics, volume 62, number 7). 
I first create a life table estimate for non-heavy drinkers by using the life table 
estimates provided by the National Vital Statistics Report (2009). The life table 
estimates presented by the CDC provides the survival probability jointly for both 
non-heavy and heavy drinker. To isolate the death cases associated with heavy 
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drinking, I refer to the multiple causes-of-death mortality data from the National 
Vital Statistics System and eliminate the cases of age-specific drinking-related 
deaths from the life table provided by the CDC.
4
 
To estimate the life table survival probabilities for heavy drinkers, I estimate the 
age-specific relative risk of dying for heavy drinkers compared to non-heavy 
drinkers. I first link the 1990 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) data with 
1990-2004 mortality files, which provides the causes and dates of the deaths of 
same individuals surveyed in 1990. Using a probit regression, I estimate the 
probability of an individual interviewed in 1990 dying between 1990 and 2004. 
The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if an individual 
dies between 1990 and 2004 (otherwise the value is 0). The specification includes 
respondents’ observed characteristics in 1990, such as smoking status (current 
smoker, former smoker, non-smoker), whether a respondent is a heavy drinker, 
gender, race, education, family income, body mass index, square of body mass 
index, and categorical variables for age intervals starting from 20 years old to 100 
with the length of each interval being 10 years. Here, heavy drinkers are defined as 
those drinking 3 or more drinks per day. To allow the effect of smoking and 
drinking to vary with age in a non-linear way, the specification also includes the 
interaction terms of categorical variables for age with indicators of whether a 
person is a current smoker, former smoker, and heavy drinker. I estimate the 
predicted probability of dying between 1990 and 2004 for non-heavy drinkers and 
heavy drinkers at the respective means for these two groups. I form a measure of 
age-specific relative risk of dying for heavy drinkers compared to non-heavy 
drinkers by dividing the predicted probability of dying for heavy drinkers by the 
predicted probability of dying for non-heavy drinkers for every age interval. This 
provides an estimate of how likely heavy drinkers are to die compared to non-
heavy drinkers. Finally, using the estimates of age specific relative risk of dying, I 
use the life table estimates of non-heavy drinkers to estimate the survival 
probability of heavy drinkers.  
Similarly, I calculate the age-specific survival probability of non-drinking heavy 
drinkers, except that in this case the indicator variable for a heavy drinker is 
switched off and mean values of explanatory variables pertaining to heavy drinkers 
are used.
5
 In this case, we can think of comparing a heavy drinker with a 
hypothetical heavy drinker who is similar to heavy drinkers in all characteristics 
except that the hypothetical heavy drinker consumes less than 3 alcoholic 
beverages per day. 
4.1.2. Results 
Table 4 shows the summary statistics of heavy drinkers and non-heavy drinkers. 
The table shows that heavy drinkers on average die approximately 10 years earlier 
than non-heavy drinkers. As expected, 50 percent of heavy drinkers smoke tobacco 
on a regular basis compared to 25 percent among non-heavy drinkers. As 
suspected, the raw comparison of life expectancy between heavy drinkers and non-
heavy drinkers will overestimate the effect of heavy drinking on years lived by 
attributing smoking-related deaths to heavy drinking. This further highlights the 
importance of hypothetical non-drinking heavy drinkers in this analysis. Consistent 
with the literature, the incidence of heavy drinking increases with income; males 
and whites are prone to drink more heavily compared to females and other races, 
respectively.  
Figure 5 presents the CDF of survival for the following three groups: non-heavy 
drinkers, non-drinking heavy drinkers, and heavy drinkers. The difference in 
survival probability between the three groups begins after 45 years of age; 
however, the difference between survival probabilities among all three groups is 
fairly consistent after 65 years of age. The probability of surviving until 70 years is 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 3(3), V. Shrestha, p.446-470. 
454 
454 
0.8, 0.72, and 0.7 for non-heavy drinkers, non-drinking heavy drinkers, and heavy 
drinkers, respectively. Table 5.1 shows the life expectancy at age 18 for all three 
groups. Compared to non-heavy drinkers, heavy drinkers on average die 6 years 
earlier; however, the estimated effect of heavy drinking on mortality is 3 years, 
which is obtained after comparing heavy drinkers with non-drinking heavy 
drinkers. The value of life year loss discounted by 3 percent to age 18 after using a 
value of $100,000 per year amounts to $57,552 for a heavy drinker, as shown in 
Table 5.2. 
Correcting for factors other than heavy drinking, such as education, smoking 
status, and body mass index, I estimate the number of deaths related to heavy 
drinking to be 11,920 for people over 50 years of age.
6
 The actual number of 
people aged 50 years and older dying due to alcohol-related liver disease is 10,199 
in 2009. The estimated number of deaths from my calculation is similar to actual 
deaths associated with heavy drinking.  
4.2. Medical Expenses  
The external cost of heavy drinking in terms of medical expenses can be 
clarified by using the following example. Assume that the cost of drinking 6 packs 
of beer per day raises one’s medical bills by $1000; a consumer with a health 
insurance (Medicaid) that pays 80 percent of the medical bill internalizes $200 of 
the medical expenditure when he/she decides to drink.  Given that the drinker does 
not pay a premium (taxes) large enough to cover the remaining $800, a portion of 
the $800 will be considered as an external cost (external cost = $800 – premium), 
which will possibly be borne by other members of the insurance pool. 
4.2.1. Data 
To evaluate the effect of heavy drinking on medical expenses, I use data from 
the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) for the years 2000 to 2012. MEPS 
provides nationally representative data for health care usage; sources of payment 
such as private insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, and other public insurance; 
classification of diseases that helps to identify alcohol-related diseases; 
expenditures by payment types (out of pocket/family, Medicare, Medicaid, private 
insurance), including inpatient and outpatient service use; and socioeconomic 
characteristics. This study uses both the Household Component (HC) and Medical 
Provider Component (MPC) from MEPS. The HC of MEPS was initiated in 1996. 
A panel is followed for two years and each year a new panel is added into the 
survey. The households selected in the MEPS are a subset of households 
participating in the preceding survey of the National Health Interview Survey 
(NHIS). 
The households participating in MEPS are asked for permission to contact their 
medical providers for information that the respondent may not be able to provide 
accurately. MPC provides information regarding “dates of visits, diagnosis and 
procedure codes, charges, and payments (MEPS HC-102F, document file).”  The 
Pharmacy Component (PC), a subcomponent of the MPC, collects information 
regarding the drugs associated with diseases, sources, and expenses. Information 
provided in the MEPS is beneficial in estimating the comprehensive medical 
expenses associated with alcohol-related diseases.  
Unlike smoking, deaths due to long-term alcohol use are relatively precise. 
MEPS data is fruitful in this aspect as it provides detailed information regarding 
the classification of diseases following the ICD9 codes, inpatient and outpatient 
expenses, pharmacy costs, and sources of payments. I use expenses related to 
cirrhosis of the liver as a proxy for alcohol-related medical expenses. Liver 
cirrhosis is the end stage of alcoholic liver disease (ALD), a serious and potentially 
fatal consequence of heavy drinking, and encompasses three conditions: fatty liver 
disease, alcoholic hepatitis, and cirrhosis. Often, alcoholic hepatitis and liver 
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cirrhosis can coexist together. A person with both alcoholic hepatitis and cirrhosis 
has a death rate of more than 60 percent with most of the deaths occurring before 
the first year (Chedid et al., 1991). 
4.2.2. Method and Results 
An ideal way to estimate medical costs associated with heavy drinking is to 
randomly assign the trait of heavy drinking across the sample of analysis and 
follow individuals over time to trace the use of medical services. Such an 
experiment is unethical. The second alternative is to use a counterfactual analysis 
for heavy drinkers and non-drinking heavy drinkers similar to Solan et al. (2004) 
did in the case of smoking. However, MEPS does not include variables regarding 
alcohol consumption. The third alternative is to directly estimate medical expenses 
related to alcoholic liver diseases (ALD) at a given point of time.
7
 Alcohol-related 
diseases are relatively more precise to identify when compared to smoking- related 
illnesses. Using liver cirrhosis, a form of alcoholic liver disease, which is a 
consequence of heavy drinking over a long period of time, I estimate the expenses 
related to heavy drinking by different payer types. 
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics from the MEPS data for years 2000 to 
2012 at a given point in time. The results from Table 6 suggest that patients with 
liver cirrhosis have a higher amount of medical expenses of all forms except family 
expenses compared to individuals without liver cirrhosis. Focusing at the 
logarithmic value of expenses, it can be deduced that such a difference in raw 
expenses are largely driven by a substantial mass of zero values among individuals 
without liver cirrhosis. The average age of individuals with liver cirrhosis is 55. 
Figure 6 shows a kernel density plot of alcoholic liver disease by age, which 
mimics Figure 3 (except for small sample size); thus suggesting that both the 
incidence and deaths from alcoholic liver disease peaks between ages 50 to 60. 
Perhaps, one would expect a lag in deaths due to alcoholic liver disease after being 
diagnosed with the disease. However, patients with liver cirrhosis and alcoholic 
hepatitis (two forms of alcoholic liver disease) have a death rate of 60 percent over 
4 years with the majority of deaths occurring before the first year. 
According to the National Vital Statistics Report of the NCHS, 30,627 deaths 
occurred in 2009 due to liver cirrhosis. Table 7.1 shows the breakdown of total 
expenses per event according to various sources of payments per event by using the 
30,627 cases of liver cirrhosis. Medicaid constitutes the largest sum of payments 
per event amounting to approximately $221 million, followed by private insurance 
totaling $144 million, and Medicare totaling $69 million. The total medical cost of 
alcohol liver disease to the social insurance system (per event) is approximately 
$296 million a year. Table 7.2 shows the respective costs by payer type discounted 
to 18 years old and expenses are reported in 2009 dollars. 
To estimate the cost of ALD, I treat data from MEPS as a period life table that 
presents the estimates of medical expenses to a hypothetical cohort if it experiences 
relevant conditions at a given point of time throughout the course of a lifetime. For 
example, using the MEPS data for the years 2000 to 2010, the hypothetical cohort 
analysis assumes that conditions governing liver cirrhosis and medical expenses for 
35 to 55 year olds and 65 to 75 year olds are similar. Figure 7 shows an abridged 
version of medical costs associated with liver cirrhosis plotted along the average 
age of the various age groups for different payer types. Figure 7 shows that family 
expenses related to liver cirrhosis are negligible throughout the lifetime. Medicaid 
expenses are $4,000 for 45 to 50 year olds per event visit, and decreases with age. 
In contrast, private insurance expenses show an opposite trend peaking at close to 
60 and decreasing after 60. Decreases in both Medicaid and private insurance 
expenses can be explained by an increasing trend in Medicare expenses after age 
60 with people switching from Medicaid and private insurance to Medicare. The 
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medical expenses adjusted by survival probabilities for a heavy drinker and 
discounted to 18 years of age are shown in Table 7.3. The table shows that 
Medicaid and private insurance covers approximately $2,000 per hospital visit. The 
reason why Medicare expenses are lower is because of the discounted value and 
the decline in survival probability of a heavy drinker after age 65. As an external 
cost associated with heavy drinking, I add the costs associated with Medicare and 
Medicaid, which sums up to $3,593.96 per event ($ $53,909.4 per lifetime).
8
 
4.3. Alcohol-Related Drunk Driving Fatalities 
The cost of drunk driving fatalities are immediate in a sense that each ounce of 
alcohol consumed has a certain probability of leading to a drunk driving fatality or 
alcohol-related accident. After imbibing alcohol, if a person is not involved in 
drunk driving, the cost falls to zero. In other words, it is unlikely that the cost of 
drinking in terms of drunk driving will accrue over time. The cost of drunk driving 
accidents can be categorized into various components. This study focuses on four 
major components: 1) The value of years of life lost due to premature death; 2) 
Property damage from alcohol-related accidents; 3) Medical expenses arising from 
alcohol-related crashes; and 4) Loss in household and market productivity from an 
injury.   
4.3.1. Data and Results 
The cases of drunk driving fatalities are not feasibly identified in NCHS. To 
estimate the number of deaths due to drunk driving, I use an age-specific 
proportion of motor vehicle fatalities attributed to drunk driving from the Traffic 




In this section I assume that there are two types of heavy drinkers: 1) Those 
who drink and drive; and 2) Those who choose not to drive drunk. If a heavy 
drinker chooses not to drink and drive, the cost associated with drunk driving is 
zero. Another assumption is that a drunk driving accident will induce a learning 
mechanism and the person involved will not drive drunk again.  
The total number of drunk driving fatalities in 2009 is approximately 7,500. 
Given that both self-reported alcohol consumption and drunk driving is 
misreported at the same level, Giesman (1987) estimates 293 million occasions of 
drunk driving annually. According to the statistics from the National Highway 
Safety Administration (2011), alcohol-impaired driving fatalities declined by 40 
percent from 1985 to 2009. Using a reduction in drunk driving fatalities as a proxy 
for the incidence of drunk driving and assuming a linear tread in reduction leads to 
an approximation of 175.8 million incidences of drunk driving in 2009. The 
average risk that an occasion of drunk driving results in death is estimated as 
0.000043. Using the statistical value of life at $2 million results in an expected cost 
of $85 per drunk driving occasion.  
To incorporate other alcohol-related driving costs, such as property damages, 
medical expenses, and loss in productivity from an injury, I rely upon the estimates 
of Blincoe et al. (2014). This study provides detailed estimates of the economic 
costs associated with motor vehicle accidents, which include drunk driving costs. 
According to their estimates, the total economic costs involved with alcohol-related 
crashes are $50 billion where the BAC level was greater than or equal to 0.08. 
Their estimates are obtained by estimating the drunk driving costs for various 
sectors, such as medical expenses, emergency services, market productivity, 
household productivity, insurance administration, workplace costs, legal costs, 
congestion costs, and property damages. These costs comprise various levels of 
severity of accidents the least severe involving property damages only (PDO) and 
the most severe being fatal accidents. It has to be noted that the total costs 
associated with alcohol-related motor vehicle accidents might be overestimated as 
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alcohol might not be the sole cause of death in all accidents. For example, if a 
sober but distracted driver runs into a car driven by a person with a BAC level 
greater than 0 at a stoplight, the accident will be recorded as alcohol-related. But in 
this case, the accident is equally likely to happen regardless of a person’s drinking 
status. Focusing on costs associated with BAC levels of 0.08 or higher reduces the 
likelihood of overestimation as 94 percent of crashes with BACs of 0.10 or higher 
are estimated to be caused by alcohol (Miller, Spicer, & Levy, 1999). Blincoe et al. 
(2014) estimates approximately 1,612,179 accidents involving alcohol, which gives 
a probability of 0.0093 that a drunk driver is involved in some form of accident. 
Following this, an average cost per alcohol-related accident of $ 31,000 (total cost 
per year/number of alcohol-related accidents per year) is estimated. The expected 
cost of an occasion of drunk driving is therefore $288. Hence, the total expected 
cost of an occasion of drunk driving is estimated as loss of statistical value of life 
plus other costs, which amounts to $373. 
4.4. Effects on Social Security 
The effect of heavy drinking on social security is pertinent from both the 
contribution and benefit aspects. Previous research has shown that alcohol 
consumption may influence earnings as well as life expectancy. Both earnings and 
life expectancy affects the revenue and payments of social security. Social security 
is a redistributive program, where benefit increases with, but is not, proportionate 
to contributions. The net effect of heavy drinking on social security is ambiguous- 
heavy drinking may reduce productivity, which reduces contributions to the social 
security fund. However, such a loss in contributions may be off-set by a reduction 
in the life expectancy among heavy drinkers. In another scenario, heavy drinking 
may not have as large of an impact as heavy drinkers have a shorter life expectancy 
and will not utilize as much social security. This counterbalances the loss in 
contributions due to the lack of productivity associated with heavy drinking. 
Hence, how heavy drinking affects social security is theoretically ambiguous.  
Ostermann & Sloan (2004) investigate the effect of heavy drinking on the Old 
Age and Survivor Insurance Trust Fund (OASI), the largest component of the 
Social Security program. The main data source used is from the Health and 
Retirement Survey (HRS), which is merged with unique individual-level taxable 
earnings data from the Social Security Administration (SSA) and provides the 
Social Security taxable earnings history. There are three main findings from the 
study: 1) The lifetime contribution of heavy drinkers to the social security program 
is greater compared to the contribution of counterfactual light/moderate drinkers; 
2) Heavy drinkers face reduced expected benefits compared to moderate drinkers; 
and 3) Greater contributions combined with lower benefits creates a net subsidy to 
the OASI by heavy drinkers. Eliminating heavy drinking would lead to a rise in the 
lifetime net expenditure (of the social security fund) among 25-year-old male and 
female heavy drinkers by $2,255 and $701, respectively. The authors conclude that 
there is no negative externality of heavy drinkers on OASI; if anything, heavy 
drinkers cross-subsidize others. I include the findings of Ostermann & Sloan 
(2004) to determine the cost of heavy drinking. Discounting the main findings of 
Ostermann & Sloan (2004) by using a discount rate of 3 percent to 18 year olds 
suggests that heavy drinkers subsidize social security by $1,201.75. 
4.5. Taxes on Earnings and Productivity 
To calculate the forgone taxes in income from loss of life expectancy due to 
heavy drinking, I use the survival probabilities estimated for heavy drinkers and 
non-drinking heavy drinkers. I combine the survival probabilities with the median 
income per age group obtained from the Census Bureau and marginal income tax 
rates extracted from the Current Population Survey of the U.S. Census Bureau and 
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the NBER TAXSIM model. I estimate the lifetime contribution in terms of income 
taxes for heavy drinkers and non-heavy drinkers discounted to 18 years of age. The 
estimates suggest that a heavy drinker contributes $923 (in 2009 dollars) less in 





Table 9 sums up the estimates of the lifetime total costs associated with heavy 
drinking. Costs associated with specific events are discussed in the previous 
section. Lifetime Medicare taxes, weighted by age-specific median earnings and 
discounted to 18 years of age, are included in the section to attribute one’s 
contribution to the state-provided healthcare system. The total number of drinks per 
lifetime is calculated by relying on the assumption that a heavy drinker consumes 3 
drinks per day for 55 years starting from age 18. It has to be noted that this 
calculation assumes that a heavy drinker’s life expectancy is 55 years at age 18 as 
portrayed in Table 5.1. The total alcohol taxes paid are then calculated by 
multiplying the total number of drinks per lifetime by the tax per drink in 2015 of 
$0.073 converted to 2009 dollars.  
Table 9 shows that the external cost of heavy drinking per drink is $1.299 in 
column (1), which assumes that a heavy drinker consuming approximately 60,000 
drinks in a lifetime will suffer from liver cirrhosis with a probability of 1 and have 
15 major hospital visits related to the disease. Column (2) then reduces the number 
of hospital visits related to liver cirrhosis to 4 but still assumes that a heavy drinker 
will suffer from liver cirrhosis. Column (3) relaxes the probability of liver cirrhosis 
to 0.2 and assumes 4 hospital visits related to liver cirrhosis. Column (3), which 
uses the most conservative estimates among the three columns, estimates the 
external cost associated with drinking to be $0.464. The elasticity estimates shown 
in Table 2, along with the external costs (per drink) from Table 9, are entered into 
equation (4) to estimate the optimal tax rate per price of one drink. For the 
calculation, I use the 2011 price level ($1.34 per beer converted to 2009 
dollars)and the elasticity estimates presented in Table 1 and 2 for 18 to 24 year 
olds.
11
 The optimal tax per drink is estimated as 47.5 percent, 25.7 percent, and 
17.15 percent of price per drink by using the estimates of columns (1), (2), and (3), 
respectively.   
As drunk driving costs do not contribute much, reducing expected costs related 
to drunk driving does not change the estimate of optimal alcohol taxation. Figure 9 
plots the optimal tax estimates by allowing the probability of liver cirrhosis to vary, 
assuming that a person with liver cirrhosis makes 4 major hospital visits. The tax 
estimates range from 25.69 percent to 14.8 percent of price per drink with the 
probability of liver cirrhosis varying from 1 to 0. Years of life lost due to heavy 
drinking comprises a significant portion of the costs associated with heavy 
drinking. It is hard to accept that a heavy drinker will internalize the costs imposed 
to family members. For example, consider a simple scenario where a heavy drinker 
dies a premature death; say, due to liver cirrhosis. For a heavy drinker to internalize 
the costs imposed on family members, he/she would: 1) Have to be fully be aware 
of the risks associated with heavy drinking; and 2) Most importantly, a heavy 
drinker should be aware of the intensity of the burden he imposes on the family 
members in terms of emotional, financial, and other grounds.
12
 Hence, in this study 
I explicitly treat costs imposed on family members as external. 
 
6. Conclusion  
Given the declining real alcohol taxes and price, mainly due to state and federal 
governments’ reluctance to increase nominal alcohol taxes, this study estimates the 
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optimal level of alcohol taxes in the United States. Drinkers now pay on average 
close to 7.5 cents per drink in tax. If alcohol taxes are to be used as a medium to 
allow heavy or risky drinkers to internalize the currently external costs associated 
with heavy drinking, alcohol taxes should address the externality imposed by heavy 
drinkers. Is the current level of alcohol taxes sufficient to cover the external costs 
associated with alcohol consumption? 
I first estimate price elasticity among moderate and heavy drinkers by using 
recent state-level changes in beer taxes. The price elasticity estimation is followed 
by estimating the costs associated with heavy drinking in terms of years of life lost, 
medical expenses, drunk driving fatalities, and forgone income taxes due to the 
premature death of a heavy drinker. I borrow the established estimates of social 
security payments among heavy drinkers from Sloan & Ostermann’s (2004) study. 
Finally, using the framework of optimal alcohol taxation by Pogue & Sgontz 
(1989), I estimate the optimal rate of alcohol taxes on the price per drink. 
Heavy drinkers do not pay their way and the current level of alcohol taxes is 
insufficient to address the external costs related to alcohol consumption even after 
using conservative estimates for external costs. The differences in survival 
probability between heavy drinkers and non-drinking heavy drinkers start at 45 
years of age. Heavy drinkers on average lose 3 years from their lives due to heavy 
drinking. The medical cost of heavy drinking is imposed mainly on private 
insurance, Medicaid, and Medicare; and the substitution into Medicare is well 
evident after the age of 65. Assuming that heavy drinkers and non-drinking heavy 
drinkers earn a similar income, heavy drinkers pay approximately $900 less income 
taxes in a lifetime. Estimates after adjusting for the probability of alcohol-related 
disease suggest that the optimal tax is 17.5 percent of the price per drink. It has to 
be emphasized that the calculation to obtain such an estimate uses conservative 
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1 Source: [Retrieved from]  
2 Using taxes instead of prices would be problematic if beer taxes were not fully passed-through as 
prices. However, the pass-through literature suggest that excise taxes of beer are at least fully 
passed through as retail prices. 
3 Such a group of people is described as “controlled” heavy drinkers in Manning et al.’s study. These 
are people with similar characteristics to heavy drinkers, but consume less than three alcoholic 
beverages per day.   
4 Alcohol-related deaths are considered to be deaths occurring due to alcoholic liver disease. The 
cases of alcohol-related motor vehicle accidents are eliminated as well. The cost associated with 
motor vehicle accidents are considered separately.  
5 The survival probabilities are not shown but are available upon request. 
6 To estimate the deaths due to alcohol, I first obtain the population of people who are above 50 from 
the U.S. Census Bureau. Then I estimate the proportion of people who are heavy drinkers (three or 
more drinks a day) by using data from the National Health Interview Survey. Finally, I use the 
predicted probability of dying for heavy drinkers by using data from the 1990 NHIS survey linked 
with the 1990-2004 mortality file to estimate the number of deaths among heavy drinkers. 
7 This process may underestimate expenses related to heavy drinking if heavy drinking increases the 
risk of other illnesses that are not directly related to heavy drinking. If anything, this will 
underestimate the external costs associated with heavy drinking. 
8 A lifetime cost associated with heavy drinking is obtained by assuming that a person has a total of 
15 events related to liver cirrhosis, which leads to hospital visits. The number of visits related to 
liver cirrhosis are allowed to vary along with the probability of suffering from liver cirrhosis. 
9Among motor vehicle fatalities, NHTSA estimates alcohol-related deaths of 17 percent for persons 
aged 16 and under, 18 percent for 16 to 20 year olds, 34 percent for 21 to 24 year olds, 30 percent 
for 25 to 34 year olds, 25 percent for 35 to 44 year olds, 21 percent for 45 to 54 year olds, 14 
percent for 55 to 64 year olds, and 5 percent for 65 years and older. This includes all fatalities 
associated with drunk driving (i.e., innocent passengers not consuming alcohol, pedestrians, and 
passengers in a vehicle with a sober driver). 
10 To estimate the amount of income taxes forgone due to heavy drinking, I assume that both heavy 
drinkers and non-drinking heavy drinkers earn similar income.  
11 The elasticity estimates for 18 to 24 year olds are used because the costs related to heavy drinking 
have been discounted to 18 years of age. As shown in Tables 1 and 2, there is no statistical evidence 
suggesting that older age groups are sensitive to higher alcohol taxes, perhaps due to already 
established patterns of habit. From the BRFSS, heavy drinkers comprise 5 percent of drinkers.  
12 For example, a child who loses his father due to liver cirrhosis would have completely different 
outcomes in life if the father did not drink. To fully internalize the costs of heavy drinking, a heavy 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics from the BRFSS (age 18-24 year olds) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Current drinker 0.556 0.497 
Drinks per month 15.055 41.333 
Log of drinks per month 2.388 1.374 
Real state-level beer tax (per gallon) 0.293 0.254 
Real cigarette tax 3.660 0.855 
Liquor outlet (per capita) 1.201 0.622 
Percent dry 3.038 8.905 
Bandummy 0.087 0.282 
BAC 0.08 percent 0.722 0.448 
Zero tolerance law 0.982 0.134 
Sunday sales ban 0.301 0.459 
Keg deposit required 2.232 10.163 
Information required  0.418 0.493 
Age 21.252 2.028 
White 0.751 0.432 
Black 0.116 0.320 
Other race 0.133 0.339 
Married 0.200 0.400 
Divorced 0.016 0.127 
Unmarried couple 0.085 0.279 
Other marital status 0.698 0.459 
Less than high school 0.134 0.341 
High school 0.371 0.483 
College 0.494 0.500 
Education missing/refused 0.001 0.032 
Employed 0.559 0.496 
Self employed 0.038 0.191 
Out of work 0.085 0.278 
Student 0.238 0.426 
Other employment status 0.080 0.271 
Income <$10,000 0.082 0.274 
10,000>=Income<15,000 0.066 0.248 
15,000>=Income<20,000 0.103 0.304 
20,000>=Income<25,000 0.124 0.329 
25,000>=Income<35,000 0.146 0.353 
35,000>=Income<50,000 0.125 0.330 
Income>=50,000 0.163 0.369 
Income (not sure) 0.163 0.369 
Income refused 0.029 0.167 
Gender (male = 1) 0.427 0.495 
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Table 2. Effect of Higher Taxes on Alcohol Consumption 
 
drinking 
participation  OLS 25th quantile 50th quantile 75th quantile 
Log (real beer tax) -0.045*** -0.038 0.024 -0.004 -0.125*** 
 
0.076 0.048 0.075 0.057 0.054 
Liquor outlets (per capita) -0.002 0.029 0.041 0.018 0.004 
 
0.046 0.022 0.034 0.026 0.025 
Percent dry 0.002 -0.015* -0.018* -0.021* -0.002 
 
0.011 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.014 
Real cigarette price -0.003 0.030 0.015 0.052** 0.053** 
  0.033 0.019 0.027 0.025 0.024 
R-square 0.111 0.131 0.063 0.082 0.084 
N 147,626 81,869 81,869 81,869 81,869 
Note: The first-part model is estimated by using a logistic regression. The second part model uses log 
of drinks consumed per month as the dependent variable. All specifications include controls for the 
proportion of states’ population affected by smoking ban in bars, anti-smoking sentiment constructed 
by using DeCicca et al.’s method, BAC of 0.08 percent, Sunday sales ban, zero tolerance policy, keg 
deposit required, age, age square, race, marital status, education, employment, income, gender, 
quarter dummies, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects. * represents p<0.10, ** represents p<0.05, 











Table 3. Division of Costs 
  Internal External 
Premature death 
 
Drinker and Family 
Pain and Suffering  Drinker and Family Drinker and Family 
Medical Costs Copay Insurance reimbursement 
Sick Leave  Uncovered sick loss Covered sick loss 
Disability  
Forgone Income not  
replaced  Disability benefit 
Pension Defined -contribution plans 
Social security and defined 
benefits 
Wages Forgone disposable income  Taxes on earnings/productivity 
Other Costs Motor vehicle damages to oneself 
Motor vehicle damages to  
innocent party 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics of Heavy and Moderate Drinkers 
  
Heavy Drinkers 
(N=322, except N=108 for 
mortality age) 
Non-Heavy Drinkers 
(N=28556, except  
N=5904 for mortality age) 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
mortality age 65.028 13.849 75.539 14.398 
smoker 0.525 0.500 0.251 0.434 
former smoker 0.217 0.413 0.241 0.427 
non-smoker 0.252 0.435 0.498 0.500 
smoking status unknown 0.006 0.079 0.010 0.100 
sex (male=1) 0.767 0.423 0.413 0.492 
white 0.845 0.363 0.823 0.382 
black 0.124 0.330 0.139 0.346 
other 0.031 0.174 0.039 0.193 
less than high school  0.189 0.392 0.221 0.415 
high school  0.410 0.493 0.377 0.485 
college  0.335 0.473 0.315 0.464 
more than college  0.065 0.247 0.085 0.279 
education unknown  0.000 0.000 0.003 0.053 
income<5,000 0.043 0.204 0.057 0.231 
income (5,000-6,999) 0.050 0.218 0.039 0.193 
income (7,000-9,999) 0.062 0.242 0.055 0.228 
income (10,000-14,999) 0.090 0.287 0.094 0.291 
income (15,000-19,999) 0.090 0.287 0.095 0.293 
income (20,000-24,999) 0.075 0.263 0.082 0.275 
income (25,000-34,999) 0.155 0.363 0.140 0.347 
income (35,000-49,999) 0.177 0.382 0.143 0.350 
income>=50,000 0.174 0.380 0.157 0.364 
income unreported 0.084 0.278 0.138 0.345 
body mass index (bmi) 25.935 8.914 26.325 14.871 
bmi square 751.826 1515.014 914.140 9105.082 
20-29 year olds  0.196 0.397 0.230 0.421 
30-39 year olds  0.286 0.452 0.236 0.425 
40-49 year olds  0.186 0.390 0.164 0.370 
50-59 year olds  0.118 0.323 0.114 0.318 
60-69 year olds  0.134 0.341 0.121 0.326 
70-79 year olds  0.062 0.242 0.093 0.290 
80-89 year olds 0.019 0.135 0.039 0.193 
90-100 year olds 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.057 
Note: The data source is the linked version of NHIS (1990) with NVSS (1990-2004) multiple causes 
of death. Heavy drinkers are defined by individuals consuming more than 3 drinks per day in the 1990 
survey. 
 






Drinker Heavy Drinker Effect of Heavy Drinking 
Life Expectancy 61.56 58.54 55.48 -3 
Note: Life expectancy for non-heavy drinkers, non-drinking heavy drinkers, and heavy drinkers at the 
age of 18 is estimated by summing a person’s years lived at and above age 18 and dividing the sum 
by the number of people alive at 0 years (100,000). The life expectancy of heavy drinkers is then 
compared with non-drinking heavy drinkers to calculate the loss in years lived attributed to heavy 
drinking. The calculation excludes deaths from alcohol-related accidents. 
 
Table 5.2. Value of Life-Years Lost 
Value of Life Years Lost 
 
$57,552 
Note: Value of life-years lost is calculated by using a value of $100,000 per life-year lost multiplied 
by expected years of life lost attributed to heavy drinking. It is discounted at 3 percent per year to age 
0. 
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics from MEPS (2000 to 2012) 
 
Liver Cirrhosis (N=374) 
No Liver Cirrhosis 
(N=283267) 
Mean Std.Dev. Mean  Std.Dev.  
family expenses 173.075 1037.057 209.456 1689.281 
Medicare expenses 3466.745 10345.060 1622.476 6154.943 
Medicaid expenses 4501.054 23750.950 412.533 3275.852 
private insurance expenses 4237.861 16306.790 1976.037 8455.277 
ER expenses 489.992 1397.448 343.407 1231.975 
total expenses 13138.950 29001.590 4856.713 12043.07 
log(Medicare expenses) 7.719 2.344 5.913 2.085 
log(Medicaid expenses) 7.339 2.358 6.945 2.174 
log(private insurance expenses) 7.485 2.041 6.396 2.014 
log(ER expenses) 5.966 1.345 5.738 1.274 
log(family expenses) 4.462 1.673 4.413 1.746 
age 55.413 14.327 47.318 23.088 
sex 0.531 0.500 0.422 0.494 
white 0.821 0.384 0.706 0.456 
black 0.102 0.303 0.106 0.307 
others 0.077 0.267 0.189 0.391 
refused 0.042 0.202 0.119 0.324 
married 0.485 0.500 0.471 0.499 
divorced, separated, widowed 0.320 0.467 0.242 0.428 
never married 0.153 0.361 0.168 0.374 
less than 5th grade 0.145 0.353 0.218 0.413 
5th grade to high school 0.510 0.501 0.414 0.493 
high school  0.111 0.314 0.145 0.352 
some college 0.235 0.424 0.221 0.415 
retire inapplicable 0.491 0.501 0.611 0.488 
retired 0.253 0.435 0.205 0.403 
not retired 0.256 0.437 0.184 0.388 
smoking inapplicable 0.173 0.379 0.156 0.363 
smoker 0.183 0.388 0.125 0.331 
non smoker 0.441 0.497 0.500 0.500 
smoke missing 0.202 0.402 0.219 0.414 
inapplicable, refused 0.779 0.415 0.588 0.492 
management, business 0.064 0.245 0.063 0.243 
professional and related 0.038 0.191 0.091 0.287 
service industry 0.014 0.119 0.069 0.253 
sales and related 0.027 0.161 0.046 0.208 
office and administrative 0.038 0.192 0.060 0.238 
farming,construction,production,  
transportation 0.040 0.196 0.084 0.277 
survey year 2000 0.012 0.110 0.067 0.251 
survey year 2001 0.025 0.157 0.081 0.273 
survey year 2002 0.054 0.226 0.093 0.291 
survey year 2003 0.116 0.321 0.079 0.270 
survey year 2004 0.112 0.316 0.084 0.277 
survey year 2005 0.105 0.307 0.079 0.269 
survey year 2006 0.113 0.317 0.075 0.264 
survey year 2007 0.073 0.261 0.072 0.258 
survey year 2008 0.135 0.343 0.075 0.263 
survey year 2009 0.052 0.222 0.076 0.265 
survey year 2010 0.107 0.310 0.075 0.263 
survey year 2011 0.046 0.211 0.075 0.263 
survey year 2012 0.048 0.215 0.070 0.254 
region unreported 0.002 0.039 0.008 0.089 
Northeast 0.201 0.401 0.219 0.414 
Midwest 0.328 0.470 0.270 0.444 
South 0.282 0.450 0.325 0.468 
West 0.188 0.391 0.178 0.382 
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Table 7.1. Breakdown of Payments by Various Sources 
 
Out of 







In-patient Expenses  5,274,562 65,442,404 220,888,104 123,300,859 4,551,583 636,870 
Outpatient Expenses 1,859,784 4,210,120 920,181 21,111,421 0 6,122 
Total Expenses by Source Type 7,134,346 69,652,524 221,808,285 144,412,280 4,551,583 642,992 
Note:  The estimates are calculated using the mean values of respective expenses and multiplying the 
estimates by 30,627 cases of deaths due to liver cirrhosis in 2009 as identified in the National Vital 
Statistics of the NCHS. The numbers above are annual estimates of respective expenses by payer’s 





Table 7.2. Cost of Health Services Attributable to Liver Cirrhosis by Payer per Event (2009 dollars) 
 
Out of 







In-patient Expense 33.198 471.568 2252.096 1232.515 49.783 0.000 
Outpatient Expenses 20.341 34.253 10.064 230.831 0.000 0.067 
Total Expenses by Source Type 53.539 505.821 2262.161 1463.345 49.783 0.067 
Note: According to the NCHS, the majority of deaths related to ALD occur between 50 and 60 years 
of age. I use 55, the mean age of death due to liver cirrhosis (except when calculating the values of 
Medicare payments, when age 65 is used) and discount the values of total in-patient and outpatient 




Table 7.3. Liver Cirrhosis Expenses per Event 
 
Out of pocket  Medicare Medicaid Private Insurance 
Total Expenses 90.22 1663.72 1930.24 1954.51 
Note:  The expenses are adjusted by age-specific survival probabilities and are discounted to 18 years 
of age using a discount rate of 3 percent. All expenses are reported in 2009 dollars. It is uncertain as 
to how many times a patient with liver cirrhosis visits a hospital. Total expenses related to liver 
cirrhosis can be obtained by multiplying above numbers by 15, which is the assigned number of times 





Table 8. Effect of Heavy Drinking on Forgone Income Taxes 
  
Survival probability 
























old 10,323 0.986 0.986 0.185 18,837.823 18,837.823 0.000 0.000 
25 to 34 31,201 0.980 0.980 0.247 75,550.680 75,550.680 0.000 0.000 
35 to 44 38,461 0.969 0.969 0.268 99,834.364 99,834.364 0.000 0.000 
45 to 54 38,979 0.929 0.934 0.274 99,181.784 99,765.748 -583.964 -226.775 
55 to 64  34,512 0.843 0.858 0.271 78848.235 80240.262 -1392.026 -402.239 
64 and up 20,816 0.697 0.731 0.237 34,384.065 36,055.217 -1671.152 -359.319 
            Total Difference -988.333 
Note: The median income for specific age groups is extracted from the Census Bureau and 
represented in 2012 dollars. Age-specific survival probabilities estimated for both heavy drinkers and 
non-drinking heavy drinkers are used. Then marginal rate of tax for each age group is based on the 
Current Population Survey of the U.S. Census for March 1996 and the NBER TAXSIM model. The 
forgone tax amount is discounted to age 18 by using a discount rate of 3 percent. The difference in 
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Table 9. Taxes, Cost, and Contribution by a Heavy Drinker 
 
cost and contribution 
(1) (2) (3) 
Costs 
   Years of Life Lost -57,552 -57,552 -57,552 
Medicare and Medicaid -53909.4 -17965 -3593 
Drunk driving  -373 -373 -373 
Effects on Social Security 1201.75 1201.75 1201.75 
Forgone Income Taxes -923 -923 -923 
Contribution 
   Lifetime Medicare Taxes* 28,910 28,910 28,910 
total number of drinks 60225 60225 60225 
total tax paid 4396.425 4396.425 4396.425 
Number of Visits 15 4 4 
Probability of Liver Cirrhosis 1 1 0.2 
Total External cost of  
Heavy Drinking -78,249 -42,305 -27,933 
Total External Cost of  
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